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BOOK REVIEW
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. By
STEIN, ANNA FREUD AND ALBERT J. SOLNIT.

a division of MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc.
($1.95 paper).

JOSEPH GOLD-

New York: The Free Press,
1973. Pp. xiv. 161. $7.95

America has been described as a child-centered society, where children's whims are catered to, where the ideal school is one in which the child
enjoys being, rather than one in which learning is paramount, where children
select not only toys for themselves, but influence decisions on family diet
and even the make of automobile purchased. Since children do have a
special role in our society, we have long had special provisions for the
handling of child-criminals and misfits. Some have felt these provisions have
not actually been beneficial to children, but it is the intent to benefit
which is the reason given for establishing a separate system.'
For over seventy-five years the citizens of the United States have supported a dual system of law and social support, one system operating for
adults, the other for children. The juvenile court system is one aspect. Detention homes and reform schools for children, in contrast to jail and prison
for adults, is another aspect. The orphanage, foster home, and child welfare agency, as opposed to the old folks home, nursing home, and welfare
agency, is still another. The rationale for this dual system has not been
based on economics or efficiency, but rather it has been based very idealistically on "the best interests of the child." 2 Underlying every decision,
every expenditure of money, every building for children has been this idea
that what was being done was in the best interest of children.
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit is
a short book which questions whether it is possible to achieve "the best
interest of the child." The authors would substitute "the least detrimental
alternative" as the standard to be achieved (p. 53). Attempting to determine "the best interests of the child" often causes the completely opposite result. Long evaluations, protracted legal process, and weighing pros and
cons of contending factions, all in the name of determining what is best, often merely creates years of uncertainty and sometimes complete disruption
of a settled and not too destructive situation.
The authors offer two guidelines for determining "the least detrimental
alternative." First, the child's needs are paramount, and this includes
psychological needs as well as physical needs. Second, there is a need for
privacy, which means a minimum of government intrusion (p. 7). Few of
us would argue with these guidelines. In fact, most of us believe that
I See In re Gault, 367 U.S. 1 (1967).
2This phrase remains embedded in the law. See, e.g., Thx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 15.01 (1974) (petition for termination of parent-child relationship may be granted if
it "is in the best interest of the child"); id. § 16.08(a) (adoption shall be granted if it
"is in the best interest of the child").
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present child care institutions and laws are aimed at achieving what is implied by these guidelines. The revolutionary ideas proposed by the authors
are contained in their definition of "needs" and the results which flow from
that definition.
Based on Miss Freud's work in England with children who were separated
from their parents during World War II, the authors contend that continuity
of relationship is more important than biological relationship (p. 31).
Following this idea to its logical conclusion, the first placement of a child
should be its final placement. When a parent, for whatever reason, places
a child in foster care for more than a short time, that placement would become permanent and the original biological tie would be of little relevance.a This idea does not seem too radical when applied only to "unfit"
parents, but the authors would apply this rule universally. It is their contention that on divorce, custody should be given permanently to one parent.
That parent should have the sole right to determine all the conditions concerning the raising of the child, and the other parent would have no legally
enforceable right of visitation. Visitation would thus be at the discretion of
the custodial parent (pp. 37-39). Aside from the emotional distress which this
rule might cause the non-custodial parent, the practical problem of childsupport and whether it will be paid seems really to be the issue which would
result from this rule. Child support payments are at best difficult to collect;
how many parents would be willing to make payments for ten to fifteen
years to a child they can never see? Furthermore, the payment or nonpayment of child support would appear to be a kind of relationship to the
child and would cause in itself an impact on the psychological tie between
the custodial parent and the child. It may be that the ideal single permanent psychological tie may not be achievable because of the child's physical
need to eat.
The difference between a child's sense of time and that of an adult is
another aspect of the child's needs which must be considered. Obviously,
one year to a two-year-old is half a lifetime. If the state were to delay
the final disposition of a twenty-year old's sentence for ten years there would
be no question that the twenty-year-old had been denied due process, ten
years representing half of the twenty-year-old's life. Yet, society
thinks nothing of imposing a six-month to two-year delay on a ruling for
disposition of an infant aged a year at the start. The authors would remedy
this by requiring decisionmakers to act with "all deliberate speed" (p. 42).
That courts can make decisions and even consider appeals quickly when
it is believed to be necessary because of an emergency is well-known. 4 The
3 Jewish parents in Holland during World War H left their children with non-Jewish
compatriots. Upon return of the parents, there were many problems. There is an
implication that it might have been better to have left the children with their foster
parents (pp. 107, 108).
4 A good example is the speed with which the problem of prior restraint in relation
to the press was handled in connection with the publication of "History of Decision
Making Process on Vietnam Policy," commonly known as the Ellsberg Papers. Summaries of this text were first published in the N.Y. Times on June 12, 1971. The
United States attempted to prevent any further publication of this material and court
action was instituted on June 14, 1971. The final court decision was rendered on
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number of such cases is small, and this fact may be part of the definition
of emergency, However, problems relating to children are voluminous, and
the authors' suggestion that we model child placement procedures on film
censorship actions (p. 44) is not persuasive. Yet the authors do point up
the need for change in this area very emphatically, and consideration should
be given to the idea that due process as to time may vary with age.
The book is very short and each idea is presented in only a few pages.
One idea which should be considered especially carefully by attorneys is
that when the child's placement becomes the subject of dispute, the child
should be recognized as an indispensable party and have an advocate of
his own (p. 66). The idea of representation for the child has gained wide
acceptance, and some would include representation in undisputed placements. 5 However, it is the description of the representative which is challenging. The advocate (attorney?) must be "knowledgeable about children
and their development" (p. 67). Does this presage a new speciality, the
child-psychiatrist-attorney?
This book should be read by everyone in the child-care field-judges,
attorneys, legislators, and social workers. It should be approached with low
expectations, however, since it is more a tract than a treatise. It is short,
psychoanalitically oriented, and dogmatic. There are no emotional passages;
it is crisp and objective. Answers, but not solutions to problems, are offered. The answers need to be viewed critically, but not with hostility.
The viewpoint expressed is different from usual family law books, and this
is what makes the book important. Texans with their new Family Code6
may become complacent. Reading Goldstein-Freud-Solnit would prevent
that. Discussion of this book in relation to the new Family Code should
keep attorneys and social workers thinking and arguing long after the new
Code procedures have become commonplace.
Ellen K. Solender*

June 30, 1971, by the United States Supreme Court. New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). The time required from the original publication through
three courts until final disposition was only a little more than two weeks.
5 See, e.g., TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 11.10 (1974). Whenever a suit to terminate
the parent-child relationship is brought, this section requires the appointment of a
guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child. This is true even when the
parents have requested the termination.
6 The Texas Family Code was completed by the state legislature in 1973, and includes coverage of husband-wife relations (title 1), parent and child relationship (title
2), and delinquent children and children in need of supervision (title 3). TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. (1974).
* B.A., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University.
Law, Southern Methodist University.
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